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Abstract
While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggrega-
tion of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less for-
mal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication.
I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline im-
possibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying
some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which
no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossi-
bility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by
deliberative democats must be holistic: It must focus on webs of con-
nected propositions, not on one proposition at a time, which echoes the
Duhem-Quine holism thesison scientic theory testing. My approach
provides a map of the logical space in which di¤erent possible group
communication processes are located.
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1 Introduction
Aggregation and deliberation are often contrasted as two very di¤erent ap-
proaches to collective decision-making. While aggregation is the merging of
conicting individual opinions into a social outcome, deliberation involves
the discussion of these opinions and their possible transformation by the
individuals deliberating. Jon Elster summarizes the di¤erence between the
two approaches as follows:
The core of the [deliberative approach] ... is that rather than
aggregating or ltering preferences, the political system should
be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and
confrontation ... [T]here would [then] not be any need for an
aggregation mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend
to produce unanimous preferences.1
The contrast between the two approaches is probably overstated. More
plausibly, they are complementary, not contradictory. In many real-world
collective decisions, aggregation is preceded by some form of group commu-
nication in the best case, by the kind of reasoned deliberation envisaged by
deliberative democrats.2 Nonetheless, social choice theory, our best formal
theory of collective decision-making, has focused mostly on aggregation and
said little about pre-decision communication. Game theorists have recently
given more attention to communication, investigating for example the incen-
tives for and against truth-telling in deliberative settings,3 but we still lack a
social-choice-theoretic model of the transformation of opinion under various
forms of group communication. The aim of this paper is to contribute to
lling this gap in the literature.
1See Elster (1986, p. 112). On deliberative democracy, see, e.g., Cohen (1989), Dryzek
(1990, 2000), Fishkin (1991), Gutman and Thompson (1996), Bohman and Rehg (1997).
2E.g., Miller (1992), Knight and Johnson (1994), Dryzek and List (2003).
3E.g., Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006), Calvert (2006), Landa and Meirowitz
(2006), Hafer and Landa (forthcoming).
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I model opinions as judgments  acceptance or rejection  on certain
propositions, drawing on the theory of judgment aggregation.4 The proposi-
tions may be logically interconnected, so that the judgments on some propo-
sitions constrain those that can rationally be held on others. This way of
modelling opinions is very general: As illustrated below, it can represent
not only beliefs but also preferences. While the theory of judgment ag-
gregation focuses on judgment aggregation functions, I here analyze what I
call judgment transformation functions. A judgment transformation func-
tion maps each admissible prole of individual sets of judgments on the
given propositions not to a collective set of judgments on them  as an
aggregation function does but to another, possibly revised prole of in-
dividual sets of judgments. The input prole represents the individuals
pre-communication judgments, the output prole their post-communication
judgments. The process may or may not lead to consensus. The concept
of a judgment transformation function is very exible, with di¤erent such
functions representing very di¤erent communication processes. Some may
satisfy conditions of good democratic deliberation, while others may capture
indoctrination or the blind mimicking of some charismatic leader.
Using the new model, I prove a baseline impossibility theorem. When
the propositions under consideration are logically connected with each other,
any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible con-
ditions must be maximally conservative: It must be the identity function,
under which nobody ever changes his or her judgment on anything. The
4 Inspired by the doctrinal and discursive paradoxes (Kornhauser and Sager 1986,
Pettit 2001), judgment aggregation was formalized by List and Pettit (2002, 2004), com-
bining Arrows (1951/1963) axiomatic approach to social choice theory with a logical
representation of propositions. Further results and model extensions were provided by
List (2003, 2004), Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006, 2007), Nehring and Puppe
(2008), van Hees (2007), Dietrich and List (2007a,b,c, 2008), Dokow and Holzman (forth-
coming, 2006) and Pigozzi (2006). Judgment aggregation theory is closely related to ab-
stract aggregation theory, e.g., Wilson (1975), Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986), Nehring
and Puppe (2002), and to the theory of belief merging (Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002).
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theorems conditions thus imply the strongest version of what Gerry Mackie
has called the unchanging minds hypothesis:
[P]ublic deliberation on a pending item seldom seems to change
anyones mind.5
The conditions, informally stated, are the following:
(1) Any prole of rational individual judgment sets is admissible as input
to the communication.
(2) The output of the communication is also a prole of rational individual
judgment sets.
(3) If there is unanimity on every proposition before communication (not
just on a single proposition), this is preserved after communication.
(4) The individuals do not always ignore their pre-communication judg-
ments in forming their post-communication judgments.
(5) The communication focuses on one proposition at a time, which in
turn can be shown to be necessary for protecting the communicative
process against strategic manipulability.6
Since only a degenerate communicative process without any opinion change
satises these ve conditions together, which would rule out e¤ective group
deliberation as envisaged by deliberative democrats, I consider relaxing some
of them. The signicance of the new theorem, I suggest, lies not in estab-
lishing the impossibility of deliberative democracy, but rather in showing
which conditions can and cannot be met if group communication is to be
e¤ective. If any one of the ve conditions is dropped, the theorems nega-
tive conclusion no longer follows. So the result provides a map of the logical
5See Mackie (2006, p. 279).
6Below I distinguish a weaker and a stronger version of this condition.
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space of possible communication processes and thereby shows us what, from
a birds eyeperspective, the functional relations between the inputs and
outputs of e¤ective deliberative processes can and cannot look like.
What, then, are the most plausible escape routes from the impossibility?
I argue that, except in special cases, the rst four conditions are hard to
give up, but the fth  the focus on a single proposition at a time  is a
plausible candidate for relaxation. Thus e¤ective group communication as
envisaged by deliberative democrats requires some kind of holism: The
objects of judgment transformation cannot generally be single propositions
in isolation, but must be larger websof interconnected propositions. This
echoes the Duhem-Quine thesis on holism in science, according to which
one cannot empirically test a single proposition in isolation, but only in
conjunction with a larger web of related propositions.7
The present conclusion renes Mackies suggestion that the network
structure of opinions a¤ects whether or not deliberation can change minds:
[D]ue to the network, the e¤ects of deliberative persuasion are typically la-
tent, indirect, delayed, or disguised.8 My result shows that the unchanging
minds hypothesis is true when communication is restricted to one proposi-
tion at a time,9 but false when communication is su¢ ciently holistic. The
price of this holism is strategic manipulability of the communication process,
by providing incentives for strategic misrepresentation of individual judg-
ments.
It may be tempting to think that the holistic property of judgment trans-
formation is just a trivial consequence of the presence of logical connections
between propositions. To see that this is not the case, notice that rational
opinion change without holism is entirely possible if one of the other four
conditions of the theorem is suitably relaxed. Even a process as non-holistic
7See Quine (1951).
8Mackie (2006, p. 279) says: The network structure of attitudes explains why the
unchanging minds hypothesis seems to be true, and why it is false.
9 In the presence of logical connections between propositions.
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as deference to the majority on each proposition, for instance, can lead to
perfectly rational post-communication judgments if the theorems rst con-
dition specifying the domain of admissible inputs to the communication
is appropriately adjusted, as shown below. The theorems conclusion is a
genuinely joint implication of its ve conditions.
After a discussion of the impossibility result, I give some examples of
feasible judgment transformation functions that do allow opinion change,
distinguishing between those that generate consensus and those that gen-
erate something less than consensus. Among the latter are transformation
functions that o¤er a new theoretical explanation of the much discussed
phenomenon of deliberation-induced meta-agreement.10 This phenomenon
is relevant to democratic decision-making because it helps to avoid some of
the notorious paradoxes of aggregation. Thus the paper contributes new
positive results in addition to its new theoretical model and impossibility
theorem. I conclude with a brief discussion of how the present work is related
to game-theoretic works on communication.11
2 Opinions as judgments on propositions
How can the opinions held by a group of individuals at a given time be
modelled? In this section, I explain how to model them as judgments on
10See note 2 and empirical evidence in List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean (2000/2006).
11 Important related works include Lehrer and Wagners (1981) model of rational consen-
sus, which can be seen as a probabilistic analogue of the judgment transformation model
(where opinions are represented not by binary judgments, but by subjective probability
assignments), and the theory of conciliation and consensus in belief merging (Konieczny
2004; Gauwin, Konieczny and Marquis 2005), whose key concept a conciliation operator
is related to the present concept of a judgment transformation function. The theory of
individual belief revision either in a Bayesian tradition or in the Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-
Makinson framework (1985) addresses a somewhat di¤erent question from the present
one. It focuses on individual belief change in response to new information rather than
the transformation of opinions in group communication. (The latter may be only partly
information-driven and sometimes not information-driven at all.)
6
propositions expressed in logic.12 I turn to their aggregation and transfor-
mation subsequently.
The ingredients of the model are the following. There is a group of indi-
viduals.13 The set of propositions considered by them is called the agenda.
Propositions are represented by sentences, generally denoted p, q; r, ...,
from propositional logic or a more general language.14 Propositional logic
can express atomic propositions, without logical connectives, such as a,
b, c, ..., and compound propositions, with the logical connectives not,
and, or, if-thenand if and only if, such as a and band if a or b, then
not c. As is standard in logic, one can distinguish between consistent and
inconsistent sets of propositions.15
Each individuals opinions at a given time are represented by a judgment
set : the set of all those propositions in the agenda that the individual ac-
cepts.16 On the standard interpretation, to accept proposition pmeans to
believe p; thus judgments are binary cognitive attitudes. Alternatively, to
accept pcould mean to desire p; judgments would then be binary emo-
tive attitudes. A judgment set is called consistent if it is a consistent set
of propositions and complete if it contains a member of each proposition-
negation pair in the agenda. A combination of judgment sets across all the
individuals in the group is called a prole.17
12This follows List and Pettit (2002, 2004) and the generalization in Dietrich (2007).
13The group is nite, and individuals are labelled 1; 2; :::; n.
14Formally, the agenda is a subset X of the logic, where (i) X is closed under negation
(if pis in X, then so is not p), (ii) not not pis identied with p, and (iii) X contains
no tautological or contradictory propositions. Instead of propositional logic, any logic
with some minimal properties can be used, including expressively richer logics such as
predicate, modal, deontic and conditional logics (Dietrich 2007).
15 In propositional logic, a set of propositions is consistent if all its members can be
simultaneously true, and inconsistent otherwise. E.g., fa, a or bg is a consistent set,
whereas fa, not ag and fa, if a then b, not bg are not. More generally, consistency
is denable in terms of a more basic notion of logical entailment (Dietrich 2007).
16Formally, individual is judgment set is a subset Ji of the agenda X.
17Formally, a prole is an n-tuple (J1; J2; :::; Jn).
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Let me give some examples of agendas of propositions on which groups
of individuals may make judgments (and to which the theorems presented
below apply).
Example 1: Climate change. A panel of experts deliberates about
climate change. The agenda on which the experts make judgments contains
the following propositions and their negations: Global CO2 emissions are
above 30000 million metric tons of carbon per annum(a); If global CO2
emissions are above this threshold, then the global temperature will increase
by at least 1.5oC by 2030 (if a then b); The global temperature will
increase by at least 1.5oC by 2030(b).18
Example 2: A tenure case. A university committee deliberates about
whether to grant tenure to a junior academic. The agenda on which the
committee members make judgments contains the following propositions
and their negations: The candidate is excellent at teaching (a); The
candidate is excellent at research (b); Excellence at both teaching and
research is necessary and su¢ cient for tenure(c if and only if (a and b));
The candidate should be given tenure(c).19
Example 3: Ranking candidates or policy options. A political
decision-making body (e.g., a legislature, committee or electorate) deliber-
ates about how to rank three or more candidates or policy options in an
order of social preference. The agenda on which the individuals make judg-
ments contains all propositions of the form x is preferable to yand their
negations, where x and y are distinct candidates or options from some set of
available ones and is preferable tois a binary relation, with the rationality
constraints on preferences built into the (predicate) logic.20
18Variants of this example appear across the literature on judgment aggregation.
19This example is due to Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006).
20For details, see Dietrich and List (2007a), drawing on List and Pettit (2004).
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Example 4: Group membership. A club, society or association de-
liberates about which candidates from a list of three or more available ones
should be granted membership, subject to the constraint that some, but not
all, candidates should be granted membership. The agenda on which the in-
dividuals make judgments contains all propositions of the form candidate j
should be granted membershipand their negations, where j is any available
candidate and the mentioned constraint is built into the logic.21
Each of these agendas exhibits certain logical connections between propo-
sitions. By contrast, trivialagendas such as those containing only a single
proposition-negation pair are not typical in complex decision-making set-
tings. To set them aside, I assume throughout the paper that the agenda is
at least minimally complex in a sense satised in all the examples but whose
technical details are not central for the exposition.22
3 The aggregation of judgments
Before I can formally analyze the problem of judgment transformation, it
is necessary to recapitulate the problem of judgment aggregation: How can
each prole of individual judgment sets on a given agenda be aggregated into
21The conjunction of the propositions in quotes is stipulated to be false and their dis-
junction to be true. The example is due to Kasher and Rubinstein (1997).
22Formally, I assume that (i) the agenda has an inconsistent subset of three or more
propositions that becomes consistent upon removing any one of its members, and (ii) it is
not (nor isomorphic to) a set of propositions whose only logical connectives are notand if
and only if. Property (ii) is a variant of non-a¢ neness (Dokow and Holzman forthcoming)
and even-number negatability (Dietrich and List 2007a). Properties (i) and (ii) are met in
examples 1 to 4. E.g., the agenda containing a, if a then b, band negations (example 1)
satises (i) because its three-member inconsistent subset fa;if a then b;not bg becomes
consistent if any one proposition is removed; it obviously satises (ii). In examples 2
to 4, a further property is met, which I assume only where explicitly stated: (iii) any
proposition in the agenda can be deduced from any other proposition in it via a sequence
of pairwise conditional entailments. Property (iii) has been introduced under the name
total blockedness by Nehring and Puppe (2002).
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Figure 1: Judgment aggregation
a collective judgment set? This problem arises, for example, in referenda
involving multiple propositions, in legislatures or committees deciding what
factual and normative propositions to accept in legislation, in multi-member
courts resolving cases on the basis of several premises, and in expert panels
seeking to merge several scientic viewpoints into a collective viewpoint.
As illustrated in Figure 1, an aggregation function is a function that
maps each prole of individual judgment sets in some domain to a collec-
tive judgment set.23 Examples of aggregation functions are majority voting,
where each proposition is collectively accepted if and only if it is accepted
by a majority of individuals; supermajority or unanimity rules, where each
proposition is collectively accepted if and only if it is accepted by a certain
qualied majority of individuals, for example, two thirds, three quarters,
or all of them; and dictatorships, where the collective judgment set is al-
ways the individual judgment set of the same antecedently xed individual,
the Arroviandictator, named after Kenneth Arrows classic impossibility
theorem.24 Many other aggregation functions have been proposed.
23While a judgment aggregation function, as dened in List and Pettit (2002), goes back
to Arrovian social choice theory, a related concept is that of a merging operator in belief
merging (Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002). Parallels are discussed in Pigozzi (2006).
24See Arrow (1951/1963). Note that Arrows theorem itself concerns preference aggre-
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Although the possibilities seem abundant, it is surprisingly di¢ cult to
nd an aggregation function that guarantees consistent collective judgment
sets. Notoriously, majority voting can produce inconsistent collective judg-
ment sets even when all individual judgment sets are consistent.25 Consider
the climate change example above (example 1), and suppose there are three
experts on the panel, with opinions as shown in Table 1. The rst expert
judges that a, if a then band b; the second judges that a, but not (if
a then b)and not b; and the third judges that if a then b, but not a
and not b. Clearly, each expert holds an individually consistent judgment
set. Yet, the majority judgments are inconsistent: Majorities accept a, if
a then b and not b, an inconsistent set of propositions in the standard
sense of logic. The same problem can arise in each of the other examples
given above.
a if a then b b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 True False False
Individual 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A prole of individual judgment sets
Can we nd aggregation funtions that are immune to this problem? The
recent literature on judgment aggregation has explored this question in great
generality. One of its generic ndings is that there exist no democratically
appealing aggregation functions satisfying the following conditions:
Universal domain. The aggregation function accepts as admissible input
any possible prole of consistent and complete individual judgment sets.
gation, not judgment aggregation. The relationship between preference and judgment
aggregation is discussed in List and Pettit (2004) and Dietrich and List (2007a).
25This is the discursive paradox (Pettit 2001, extending Kornhauser and Sager 1986),
which generalizes Condorcets paradox of majority voting (List and Pettit 2004).
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Collective rationality. The aggregation function produces as output a
consistent and complete collective judgment set.
Consensus preservation. If all individuals hold the same judgment set,
this is also the collective judgment set.
Independence/systematicity. The collective judgment on any propo-
sition p on the agenda depends only on individual judgments on p [and
the pattern of dependence is the same across propositions]. (Independence
omits, and systematicity includes, the neutrality clause in square brackets.)
Theorem 1 Any aggregation function satisfying universal domain, collec-
tive rationality, consensus preservation and independence/systematicity is a
dictatorship of one individual.26 (Whether the result requires independence
or systematicity depends on how the minimal complexity of the agenda is
dened.27)
A lot could be said about how to interpret this theorem, which gener-
alizes Arrows original impossibility theorem.28 To avoid the dictatorship
conclusion, we must relax one of universal domain, collective rationality,
consensus preservation or independence/systematicity. Given the present
focus on group communication, however, I set these issues aside for the mo-
ment and return to analogous issues when I present the new theorem on the
transformation of judgments.
26This theorem was proved by Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman
(forthcoming), building on earlier results by List and Pettit (2002), Nehring and Puppe
(2002), Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006).
27 If the agenda meets only properties (i) and (ii), systematicity is needed for the result;
if it also meets property (iii), independence is enough.
28This is because Theorem 1 also applies to the special case of preference aggregation,
representable in the judgment aggregation model, as in the case of ranking candidates or
options in example 3 above. Explicit derivations of Arrows theorem (1951/1963) as a
corollary of Theorem 1 are given in Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman
(forthcoming). For earlier derivations of Arrow-like results from judgment and abstract
aggregation results, see Wilson (1975), List and Pettit (2004) and Nehring (2003).
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Figure 2: Judgment transformation
4 The transformation of judgments
To model the transformation of judgments, I introduce the new concept of a
judgment transformation function. As illustrated in Figure 2, this is dened
as a function that maps each prole of individual judgment sets in some
domain to a prole of individual judgment sets in some co-domain, possibly
the same as the domain.29 The input prole represents the individuals
judgments before communication, the output prole their judgments after
communication. The output judgments may or may not di¤er from the
input judgments, and the transformation may or may not lead to consensus.
A simple example of a transformation function is deference to the ma-
jority, where, after communication, each individual accepts all those propo-
sitions that a majority accepts before communication. But just as majority
voting as an aggregation function fails to guarantee consistent collective
judgments, so deference to the majority as a transformation function fails
29Just as a judgment aggregation function is related to a belief merging operator, so
a judgment transformation function is related to a belief conciliation operator (Gauwin,
Konieczny and Marquis 2006). Pigozzis (2006) insights on the parellels between judgment
aggregation and belief merging apply, mutatis mutandis, to revision too.
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to guarantee consistent output judgments.30 If each expert in the climate
change example were to defer to the majority judgments in Table 1, for in-
stance, the resulting post-communication judgments would be inconsistent.
An alternative to deference to the majority is deference to a supermajor-
ity or unanimity : Here each individual accepts all those propositions after
communication that a certain qualied majority perhaps everyone ac-
cepts before communication. If the supermajority threshold is su¢ ciently
large, such a transformation function performs better than deference to a
majority at securing consistency. If the propositions are as in the climate
change example, for instance, any threshold greater than two thirds guaran-
tees consistent output judgments.31 But such a transformation function has
problems of its own. First, the individualspost-communication judgments
will be incomplete on all those issues on which there is no supermajority
consensus; and second, they may violate deductive closure: An individual
may come to accept aand if a then b, because each receives the required
supermajority support, and yet fail to accept b, because there is no super-
majority consensus on b. Moreover, it is hard to solve these two problems
together. Only a unanimity threshold can generally prevent violations of de-
ductive closure,32 but it also amplies the incompleteness problem, because
it permits the acceptance of only those propositions on which there is total
agreement.
Other examples of transformation functions are opinion leader functions,
where each individual adopts as his or her output judgment set the input
judgment set of an antecedently xed individual, called the individuals opin-
ion leader. The opinion leader may di¤er for di¤erent individuals or be the
same across individuals. In the latter case, the opinion leader function is the
communicative analogue of a dictatorial aggregation function. An opinion
30For a critique of deference to a majority, see Pettit (2006).
31To make this distinct from unanimity deference, the group size must be greater than
three. For a discussion of deference to a supermajority, see List (2006b).
32For a proof, see Dietrich and List (2007b).
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leader function may represent not only the presence of one or several par-
ticularly persuasive individuals but also the e¤ects of indoctrination, pro-
paganda or, if di¤erent individuals cluster around di¤erent opinion leaders,
group fragmentation. Finally, an entirely degenerate transformation func-
tion is the identity function, where the output prole is always the same as
the input prole: Nobody ever changes his or her judgments.
None of these examples of judgment tranformation functions appear to
be particularly deliberative. This is not accidental. Just as many (in fact,
most) possible aggregation functions do not qualify as democraticthink
of Arrovian dictatorships as the most extreme examples so many (again,
most) transformation functions are far from deliberative in the sense of
the normative literature on deliberative democracy. The main purpose of
dening judgment transformation functions in such general terms is to have
a exible concept available which allows us to represent a large spectrum
of possible communication processes, ranging from degenerate ones without
any opinion change and ones involving indoctrination to deliberation. Below
I introduce some other, arguably more compelling judgment transformation
functions. In particular, I discuss the class of so-called constrained min-
imal revision functions, which may be of some relevance for theoretically
explaining the empirically observed phenomenon of deliberation-induced
meta-agreement. Generally, a transformation function may depend on the
individuals, their context and the agenda of propositions under considera-
tion.
Just as the theory of judgment aggregation seeks to characterize the log-
ical space of possible aggregation functions satisfying various conditions, so
I now want to explore the logical space of possible transformation functions
satisfying certain conditions. This exercise is illuminating from two perspec-
tives. From a normative perspective, deliberative democrats have proposed
a number of desiderata that a group communication process should meet
in order to count as properly deliberative. Habermass conditions on an
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ideal speech situation are well-known desiderata of this kind. I do not
analyze Habermass own conditions here, but by formalizing such desider-
ata as conditions on a transformation function e.g., as conditions on its
inputs, outputs or the relationship between inputs and outputs we may
ask whether they can be met together and what a transformation function
looks like that meets them all. From a positive perspective, several e¤ects of
group communication on individual opinions are empirically known, rang-
ing from meta-agreementto group polarization.33 By formally describing
such e¤ects as properties of the underlying transformation function, we may
investigate what transformation functions explain those empirically observed
e¤ects. While my model is consistent with either of these interpretations 
normative or positive the results provable in it must obviously be viewed
di¤erently depending on whether the conditions on a transformation func-
tion are interpreted normatively or positively.
5 An impossibility result
Let me introduce ve conditions on a transformation function.34 Although
each condition can be made plausible, I do not suggest that they are all
equally compelling; indeed, I relax some of them below. However, they are
useful for analyzing the logical space of possible transformation functions.
Universal domain. The transformation function accepts as admissible
input any possible prole of consistent and complete individual judgment
sets.
Universal domain requires the transformation function to cope with con-
ditions of pluralism on the input side, subject to the constraint of full indi-
33For evidence of these two kinds of e¤ects, see List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean
(2000/2006) and Sunstein (2002), respectively.
34As will be apparent, four of these conditions have analogues in the context of aggre-
gation; one condition, miminal relevance, has no established counterpart in the literature
on aggregation.
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vidual rationality. A more demanding input condition would require it to
cope also with less than fully rational individual judgments; but the theorem
below shows that even the present requirement is far from undemanding.
Rational co-domain. The transformation function produces as output a
prole of consistent and complete individual judgment sets.
Rational co-domain requires the transformation function to generate out-
puts that also meet the constraint of full individual rationality. Below I
consider a weaker variant of this requirement.
Consensus preservation. The transformation function maps any unani-
mous prole to itself.
Consensus preservation requires that, if all individuals agree on all propo-
sitions on the agenda before communication, this all-way consensus be pre-
served after communication. This is distinct from either of the following,
arguably less plausible conditions. The rst is consensus generation, the
requirement that the transformation function map every prole to a unan-
imous prole, as captured by Elsters quote above. Although endorsed by
many deliberative democrats, especially those of a Habermasian orientation,
this requirement seems unduly demanding and empirically unrealistic. The
second condition from which consensus preservation is distinct is proposition-
wise unanimity preservation, the requirement that if all individuals agree on
a particular proposition pbefore deliberation, without necessarily agreeing
on anything else, this unanimity on pbe preserved after deliberation. This
requires that even an incompletely theorized agreement on pbe preserved
in communication, even if di¤erent individuals agree on pfor incompatible
reasons. Such a requirement is neither normatively compelling nor empir-
ically realistic.35 For example, upon noticing that you and I support p
35On incompletely theorized agreements, see Sunstein (1994) and, in the context of judg-
ment aggregation, List (2006a). For critiques of propositionwise unanimity preservation,
see Bradley (2007), Mongin (2005) and Nehring (2005).
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for incompatible reasons, we may each decide to give up our belief in p.
By contrast, consensus preservation is the much milder requirement that an
all-way consensus on everything in those rare cases in which it occurs be
stable under communication.
To state the next condition, call two proles variants for a given indi-
vidual if they coincide for all individuals except the given one.
Minimal relevance. For each individual, there exists at least one admissi-
ble pair of variant input proles for which the individuals output judgment
sets di¤er.
Minimal relevance requires that individuals do not always ignore their
pre-communication judgments. This is a very mild requirement: It only
rules out that an individuals pre-communication judgments never make
any di¤erence to his or her post-communication judgments. It does not
require those pre-communication judgments to make a di¤erence more than
once, nor does it say anything about how they should make a di¤erence.
Consistently with minimal relevance, the individuals post-communication
judgments could even respond negatively to his or her pre-communication
judgments.
Independence/systematicity. Each individuals output judgment on any
proposition on the agenda depends only on the input judgments on that
proposition across the group [and the pattern of dependence is the same
across propositions]. (Again, independence omits, and systematicity in-
cludes, the neutrality clause in square brackets.)
Independence is a requirement of local as opposed to holistic com-
munication: The post-communication judgments on any proposition should
be determined by pre-communication judgments on that proposition and
should not depend on pre-communication judgments on other propositions.
Systematicity adds to this a neutrality requirement across propositions. In
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the climate change example, independence requires, for instance, that in-
dividualspost-communication judgments on whether emissions above the
relevant threshold would lead to the specied temperature increase (if a
then b) depend only on pre-communication judgments on this proposition
and not on pre-communication judgments on, say, whether emissions are in
fact above the threshold (a). In the group membership example, to give
another illustration, independence requires that post-communication judg-
ments on whether a particular candidate should be granted membership
depend only on pre-communication judgments regarding this candidate, not
on pre-communication judgments regarding other candidates.
Whether one considers independence plausible seems to depend, from
a normative perspective, on whether a focus on one proposition at a time
is deemed desirable in group communication and, from a positive one, on
whether real-world communication processes display such a focus. However,
the most compelling justication of independence is that it is a necessary
condition for strategy-proofness. A communication process is strategy-proof
if truthful expression of judgments is a weakly dominant strategy for every
participant. Under su¢ ciently permissive assumptions about individual in-
centives, the requirement of strategy-proofness is met if and only if the
transformation function satises independence and another condition called
monotonicity.36 If one considers strategy-proofness desirable, as many de-
liberative democrats do, one may therefore have to endorse independence
too.37 Moreover, independence also prevents various forms of agenda ma-
36This follows from related results on aggregation (Dietrich and List 2007c, Nehring and
Puppe 2002). Monotonicity requires that any individuals post-communication acceptance
of a given proposition should not be reversed if the pre-communication prole changes
such that one additional individual supports the proposition in question and all other
individualsjudgments remain the same.
37 Independence (with monotonicity) is also equivalent to non-manipulability (Dietrich
and List 2007c). A revision function is non-manipulable if there exist no prole, individuals
i; j, and proposition pon the agenda such that i can manipulate j on p, i.e., (i) if i ex-
presses his/her pre-communication judgment set truthfully, then js post-communication
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nipulability, in which an agenda setter can manipulate the judgments on
some propositions by including others in the agenda or excluding them from
it.38
Although these ve requirements on group communication may seem
initially plausible, I now show that only a maximally conservative commu-
nication process can meet them all. Although the proof turns out to be
remarkably simple ex post, the result is nonetheless surprising ex ante. Re-
call that the identity function is the transformation function that maps every
prole to itself.
Theorem 2 The only transformation function satisfying universal domain,
rational co-domain, consensus preservation, minimal relevance and indepen-
dence/systematicity is the identity function. (As before, whether the result
requires independence or systematicity depends on how the minimal com-
plexity of the agenda is dened.39)
Proof. Consider any transformation function satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 2. Notice that this transformation function can be decomposed
into n separate functions, where the i-th such function maps each prole of
individual judgment sets in the domain of the transformation function to
individual is output judgment set. Formally, each of these n functions 
being a mapping from proles of judgment sets to single judgment sets is
an aggregation function. Its interpretation is obviously di¤erent from the
standard one: It is not the group that faces an interpersonal aggregation
problem here, but each individual who faces an intrapersonal one, namely
judgment on pdisagrees with is pre-communication judgment on p; and (ii) if i misrep-
resents his/her pre-communication judgment set, then js post-communication judgment
on p agrees with is pre-communication judgment on p. (The case i = j rules out
self-manipulation.)
38Variants of this point have been established by List (2004) and Dietrich (2006) in the
context of judgment aggregation, but carry over to judgment transformation.
39Again, if the agenda meets only properties (i) and (ii), systematicity is needed for the
result; if it also meets property (iii), independence is enough.
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the problem of how to reconcile the judgments of the other individuals with
his or her own judgments. Since the underlying transformation function
satises universal domain, rational co-domain, consensus preservation and
independence/systematicity the condition of minimal relevance is not yet
used each induced aggregation function satises universal domain, collec-
tive rationality (here meaning rationality of the output judgment sets), con-
sensus preservation and independence/systematicity. By Theorem 1 above,
it is therefore a dictatorship of one individual.40 This already shows that
the underlying transformation function must be an opinion leader function,
where each individual adopts as his or her output judgment set the in-
put judgment set of some antecedently xed individual, his or her opinion
leader (the dictator in the terminology of the induced aggregation function).
Could any individuals opinion leader be distinct from the individual him-
or herself? Now the condition of minimal relevance comes into play. If
any individual had another individual as his or her opinion leader, minimal
relevance would be violated contrary to the proofs assumption: The indi-
viduals output judgment set would be invariant under any changes of his or
her input judgment set. Each individual must therefore be his or her own
opinion leader. Consequently, the transformation function is the identity
function. This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 is an impossibility result, showing that e¤ectivegroup com-
munication is impossible under the given ve conditions. In particular, they
imply the unchanging minds hypothesis: Under them, there is no opinion
change in communication. In consequence, the result casts doubt on these
conditions.
From a normative perspective, one does not want to impose conditions
on group communication that are so restrictive as to be met only by a de-
generate communication process in which nobody ever changes his or her
40The qualications regarding independence and systematicity in Theorem 1 (note 27)
apply here too and thus carry over to Theorem 2.
21
judgments. This would be against the spirit of the normative literature on
deliberative democracy. Further, Theorem 2 implies that the ve introduced
conditions are inconsistent with the further condition of consensus gener-
ation discussed above, which is implicit in many writings on deliberative
democracy, as illustrated by Elsters opening quote. If one did expect com-
munication to produce consensus, one could not also expect it to meet the
ve introduced conditions.
From an empirical perspective, although it is frequently observed, as
Mackie notes, that public deliberation on a pending item seldom seems to
change anyones mind,41 group communication does not always exhibit the
extreme conservatism implied by the theorem. There is plenty of empirical
evidence that opinions do change in deliberative settings.42 Let me therefore
go through the conditions one by one and consider relaxing them.
6 Mapping out the possibilities
6.1 Relaxing universal domain
Universal domain requires the transformation function to cope with any
level of pluralism in its input, subject only to the constraint of individual
rationality. What happens if this is weakened to the requirement that it
should cope only with those input proles that exhibit a certain amount
of cohesion among the individuals? Then there exist transformation func-
tions other than the identity function that satisfy all the other conditions.
An example is deference to the majority, which guarantees consistent post-
communication judgments provided no proles are deemed admissible in
which distinct majorities support mutually inconsistent propositions. Could
pre-communication judgments exhibit this amount of cohesion?
Suppose, for example, that even before communication the individuals
41See Mackie (2006, p. 279), as quoted above.
42See, among many contributions, Luskin, Fishkin and Jowell (2002).
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agree on some cognitive or ideological dimension in terms of which to think
about the propositions on the agenda a meta-agreementand that, in
consequence, the individuals can be aligned from left to right on that dimen-
sion such that, for each proposition on the agenda, the individuals accepting
the proposition are either all to the left, or all to the right, of those rejecting
it.43 Deference to the majority is then guaranteed to yield consistent and
absent ties complete post-communication judgments. Consider, for ex-
ample, the individual judgments over the agenda containing a, if a then b
and b, as shown in Table 2, where the required left-right alignment of the
individuals here from 1 to 5 holds.
Ind. 1 Ind. 2 Ind. 3 Ind. 4 Ind. 5
a True False False False False
if a then b False True True True True
b False False False True True
Table 2: Unidimensionally aligned judgments
Notice that the majority judgments in Table 2 coincide with the judg-
ments of the median individual relative to the left-right alignment, here in-
dividual 3. Generally, given any prole of the form described, no proposition
can be supported by a majority unless it is also supported by the median in-
dividual. So, by deferring to the majority, individuals inherit the consistent
judgments of the median individual.44 In this way, communication moves
individual opinions in a centrist direction.
Another type of cohesion su¢ cient for consistent majority judgments ap-
plies to ranking judgments, as in example 3 above. Note that an individuals
set of ranking judgments can be viewed as expressing a ranking of the given
options (or candidates) from most to least preferable. Let some left-right
ordering of these options be given; this could order them from most socialist
43For a formal treatment of this kind of meta-agreement, see List (2002, 2003).
44Assuming full rationality of that individual, in accordance with universal domain.
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Figure 3: Single-peaked ranking judgments
to most capitalist, from most secular to most religious, from most urban to
most rural, or in any other way. An individuals set of ranking judgments is
called single-peaked relative to that left-right ordering if the individual has
a most highly ranked option somewhere on the ordering with a decreasing
ranking as options get more distant from it in either direction. This is il-
lustrated by the two rankings in Figure 3 of the options x, y, z, v, w from
most (1st) to least (5th) preferable. A prole (across individuals) is called
single-peaked if there exists a left-right ordering of the options relative to
which all individuals ranking judgment sets are single-peaked. A classic
result by Duncan Black shows that, for any single-peaked prole of ranking
judgments, the resulting majority judgments are consistent.45 Consequently,
if pre-communication ranking judgments are single-peaked, individuals can
form consistent post-communication judgments by deferring to the majority.
Does such pre-communication cohesion provide a plausible escape route
from the impossibility result on judgment transformation? Although pre-
communication proles may sometimes exhibit the required amount of cohe-
sion, this cannot generally assumed to be the case. Often the aim of commu-
nication is precisely to deal with pluralism. While consensus, or some other
45See Black (1948). Single-peakedness is one particular su¢ cient condition for consistent
majority ranking judgments. A more general condition is value-restriction (Sen 1966).
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form of cohesion, may ideally be the output of communication, requiring it as
its input appears to miss the point of communication. Nonetheless, one pos-
sible interpretation of the impossibility result is that, if rational co-domain,
consensus preservation, minimal relevance and independence/systematicity
are required, then non-degenerate judgment transformation is possible only
if individuals enter the process with su¢ cient initial cohesion.
6.2 Relaxing rational co-domain
Rational co-domain requires the individuals output judgment sets to be
both consistent and complete. Suppose this is weakened to the require-
ment that output judgment sets be merely consistent and deductively closed,
where deductive closure means that individuals accept the implications of
other accepted propositions, at least when they are also included in the
agenda. Deductive closure is much less demanding than completeness,46 as
it is satised, for example, even by an empty judgment set. Requiring de-
ductive closure, particularly in a deliberative setting, is plausible47 because
a frequently stated aim of proper deliberation is not just to lead people to
form considered judgments on the propositions on the agenda but also to
make them aware of the implications of their judgments.
What happens if rational co-domain is relaxed in this way? Unfortu-
nately, it does not open up a compelling escape route from the impossibil-
ity result. Any transformation function satisfying the weakened co-domain
condition together with the other conditions universal domain, consensus
preservation, minimal relevance, independence/systematicity is of the fol-
lowing form. For each individual, there exists a xed subset of individuals in
which he or she is included his or her peer group (in the limiting case, this
could be the singleton set containing only the individual him- or herself) 
such that the individuals output judgment set is always the intersection of
46 In the presence of consistency.
47At least when conned to propositions on the agenda, as assumed here.
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the input judgment sets among the individuals peers.48 Arguably, such a
transformation function is no better, and possibly worse, than the identity
function: It has the property that each individuals output judgment set is
always a subset of his or her input judgment set. At best an individuals
judgment set remains unchanged after communication, at worst it shrinks.
How much it shrinks depends on the size of the individuals peer group and
the amount of disagreement among the peers. Such a transformation func-
tion perhaps instantiates the combination of a conservative and a sceptical
attitude: An individual never comes to accept a proposition he or she did
not accept in the rst place and never continues to accept a proposition
unless everyone in his or her peer group agrees with it.
6.3 Relaxing consensus preservation
Consensus preservation is the requirement that the transformation function
map any unanimous prole to itself. Relaxing this requirement is not a
very promising route. First, the requirement is already very mild, as argued
above. But, secondly, even if one were prepared to drop it, this would not
lead very far: Under slightly stronger assumptions about how the proposi-
tions on the agenda are interconnected, Theorem 2 continues to hold even
without consensus preservation.49 I therefore set this route aside here.
48This follows from a result on judgment aggregation without full rationality (Diet-
rich and List 2008, generalizing Gärdenfors 2006; see also Dokow and Holzman 2006).
It still holds if the transformation function admits as input any prole of consistent
and deductively closed judgment sets (not requiring completeness); a weakened indepen-
dence/systematicity condition su¢ ces for the result.
49 If systematicity is required, the relevant agenda assumption is the conjunction of (i),
(ii) and a property called asymmetry ; this follows from a result by Dietrich (2007). If only
independence is required, the relevant agenda assumption is atomic closure or atomicity ;
this follows from results by Pauly and van Hees (2006) and Dietrich (2006).
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6.4 Relaxing minimal relevance
Minimal relevance rules out that an individuals pre-communication judg-
ment set never makes any di¤erence to his or her post-communication judg-
ment set. As in the case of consensus preservation, relaxing minimal rele-
vance does not lead to a strong escape route from the impossibility theorem.
Not only is minimal relevance a mild requirement, but, as shown in the proof
of Theorem 2, its relaxation makes possible only a very restrictive class of
transformation functions, namely that of opinion leader functions. Under
an opinion leader function, each individual adopts as his or her output judg-
ment set the input judgment set of an antecedently xed individual, the
individuals opinion leader. As noted, an opinion leader function is analo-
gous to a dictatorial aggregation function except that di¤erent individuals
may defer to di¤erent opinion leaders. Obviously, such a transformation
function is plausible at most in special circumstances, for example when
individuals have reasons to think that their opinion leaders have a special
expertise on the agenda of propositions under consideration.
6.5 Relaxing independence/systematicity
Independence requires the transformation function to determine the out-
put judgment on any proposition solely on the basis of the individualsin-
put judgments on that proposition, with systematicity requiring in addition
that the pattern of dependence be the same across propositions. As noted
above, this can be viewed as a constraint of localdeliberation, requiring
the consideration of one proposition at a time. Given the limited appeal of
the previous escape routes from the impossibility result, it seems natural to
relax independence.
If we give it up, one possibility is for each individual to designate some
propositions on the agenda as premises and others as conclusions and
to generate his or her post-communication judgments by deferring to the
pre-communication majority judgment on each premise and then deriving
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the judgments on other propositions from these majority judgments on the
premises. If the premises are chosen as a logical basisfor the entire agenda
that is, they are mutually independent and any assignment of truth-values
to them settles the truth-values of all other propositions the resulting trans-
formation function guarantees consistent and complete post-communication
judgments and satises all the other conditions introduced above. The choice
of premises and conclusions need not be the same across individuals.
While the present class of transformation functions is the judgment-
transformation analogue of the premise-based proceduresin the context of
aggregation, a more general class of transformation functions draws on the
sequential priority proceduresof aggregation.50 Here each individual deter-
mines a particular order of priority among the propositions on the agenda,
interpreting earlier propositions in that order as epistemically (or otherwise)
prior to later ones. The individual then considers the propositions one-by-
one in the chosen order and forms his or her post-communication judgment
on each proposition as follows. If the pre-communication majority judgment
on the proposition is consistent with the judgments the individual has made
on propositions considered earlier, then he or she defers to that majority
judgment; but if it is inconsistent with those earlier judgments, then he or
she accepts the implications of those earlier judgments. In the case of Table
1, for example, an individual may consider the propositions in the order a,
if a then b, b (with negations interspersed) and then accept aand if
a then bby deferring to the pre-communication majority judgments while
accepting bby logical inference. The output prole under such a trans-
formation function is sensitive to each individuals chosen order of priority
among the propositions. This property of the transformation function can
be seen as a virtue or as a vice, depending on ones perspective. On the one
hand, it takes into account the fact that di¤erent propositions may have a
50On these two kinds of procedures of aggregation, see Pettit (2001) and List (2004),
respectively.
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di¤erent status.51 But on the other hand, it makes individuals manipulable
by a cunning Rikerian herestheticianwho leads them to consider propo-
sitions in a strategically adjusted order.52 In the next section, I discuss a
third and arguably particularly interesting class of transformation functions
that becomes possible once independence/systematicity is dropped.
What is the cost of violating independence? As already noted, a trans-
formation function violating it may be susceptible to strategic agenda set-
ting as well as provide incentives for strategic misrepresentation of pre-
communication judgments. To illustrate the latter, consider the climate
change example with individual judgments as shown in Table 1 above, and
suppose the experts form their post-communication judgments in the se-
quential manner just described, considering the propositions in the order
a, if a then b, b. Suppose, further, that the second expert, who does not
accept that there will be the specied temperature increase (proposition b),
does not want his or her colleagues to accept that proposition either. Under
the sequential transformation function, he or she may lead them to accept
not bby misrepresenting his or her judgment on a, strategically express-
ing the view that not a. Such possibilities of strategic manipulation arise
as soon as the transformation function violates independence.53 The impos-
sibility theorem presented can therefore be seen as describing a dilemma be-
tween two problems of a group communication process: unchanging minds
on the one hand and strategic manipulability on the other.
7 Away from consensus
While proponents of deliberative democracy sometimes expect group com-
munication to bring about consensus, there is very little empirical evidence
51E.g., Pettit (2001) and Chapman (2002).
52See Riker (1986) and List (2004).
53See notes 36 and 37.
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of this e¤ect.54 It is also unclear whether achieving consensus is always nor-
matively desirable. Moreover, if we do require transformation functions to
satisfy consensus generation, then the problem of judgment transformation
formally collapses into that of judgment aggregation, and the only remaining
transformation functions satisfying universal domain, rational co-domain,
consensus preservation and independence/systematicity dropping minimal
relevance are those opinion leader functions in which all individuals defer
to the same opinion leader, the equivalent of an Arrovian dictator. This
is particularly ironic in so far as the possibility of a deliberation-induced
consensus is often proposed as a solution to, not a variant of, the notorious
problem of aggregation.
Could group communication bring about something less than consensus
that is still helpful for democratic decision-making  for example, by fa-
cilitating the consistent aggregation of post-communication judgments? A
recent literature suggests that the kind of group communication envisaged
by deliberative democrats may have this e¤ect, at least under favourable
conditions.55 Recall the earlier discussion of the possibility that individu-
als agree on some cognitive or ideological dimension in terms of which to
think about the relevant propositions or, in the case of ranking judgments,
the candidates or policy options. While such meta-agreementmay be too
demanding as a pre-condition for communication, it can more plausibly be
expected as its outcome. In an empirical study using data from James
Fishkins deliberative polls, such an e¤ect has been identied.56 Groups of
between 150 and 350 randomly sampled participants were interviewed on
their ranking judgments over multiple policy options both before and after
a period of group deliberation. Deliberation increased the proximity of these
54For evidence from deliberative polls, see List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean
(2000/2006).
55See notes 2 and 10. William Riker (1982, p. 128) conceded that [i]f, by reason of
discussion, debate, civic education, and political socialization, voters have a common view
of the political dimension ..., then a transitive outcome is guaranteed.
56See List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean (2000/2006).
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ranking judgments to single-peakedness, as dened above a deliberation-
induced movement towards meta-agreement.
Can we nd an empirically plausible class of transformation functions
to explain this e¤ect? Let me introduce the class of constrained minimal
revision functions. Under such a function, the transformation of judgments
takes place in two stages. An input prole is given. At the rst stage, the
group identies a particular set of judgment sets that are deemed admissible
as output judgment sets conditional on the given input prole. Formally,
this can be modelled as the application of a focusing function, which maps
the input prole to a set of admissible output judgment sets. The latter set
should ideally have the property that any prole constructible from it leads
to consistent majority judgments. At the second stage, each individual
selects an output judgment set from the identied set of admissible ones.
Formally, this can be modelled as the application of a minimal judgment
revision policy, under which each individual chooses an output judgment set
from the set of admissible ones that is as close as possible to his or her input
judgment set, relative to some distance metric over judgment sets.57 This
xes the output prole and thereby completes the denition.
Informally, the rst stage involves the identication of the opinions that
can reasonablybe held after group communication given the opinions be-
fore communication; and the second stage involves a change of individual
opinions such that each individual ends up holding one of the reasonable
ones. Whether an individuals post-communication opinion coincides with
his or her pre-communication opinion depends on whether it was already
among the ones identied as reasonableduring the rst stage of the process.
Crucially, two ingredients of this denition allow a number of di¤er-
ent specications: the groups focusing function at the rst stage, and each
individuals distance metric over judgment sets at the second. Thus the
denition species an entire class of transformation functions, one for each
57On the notion of minimal revision, see, e.g., Schulte (2005).
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possible specication of these two ingredients.
To illustrate how a constrained minimal revision function can bring
about a meta-agreement, suppose again a group deliberates about how
to rank three or more policy options in an order of social preference (exam-
ple 3), as in the deliberative polls studied empirically. The following con-
strained minimal revision function generates single-peaked output proles.
For a given pre-communication prole, it is rst determined which left-right
ordering of the options renders a maximal number of individualsranking
judgment sets single-peaked, as dened above.58 Now a ranking judgment
set is deemed admissible if and only if it is single-peaked relative to the
identied left-right ordering. This species the groups focusing function
and completes the rst stage. Each individual then minimally revises his or
her ranking judgment set so as to adopt one of the admissible ones; here an
individuals distance metric could be the Hamming distance, whereby the
distance between any two judgment sets is the number of propositions on the
agenda on which these judgment sets disagree.59 This determines the post-
communication prole and completes the second stage. By construction,
this transformation function guarantees a single-peaked output prole.
Further empirical research is needed to test whether a suitable con-
strained minimal revision function can explain the precise patterns of
deliberation-induced opinion change observed in deliberative polls and other
experiments. To the best of my knowledge, however, the present approach is
the rst attempt to model a deliberation-induced meta-agreementformally.
From a normative perspective, further questions need to be asked on
whether a suitable constrained minimal revision function captures the re-
quirements of a good communication process as discussed in the literature
58 In List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean (2000/2006), such a left-right ordering is called
a largest structuring dimension.
59The Hamming distance has been applied to judgment aggregation by Pigozzi (2006).
In the case of ranking judgment sets it captures the so-called Kemeny distance between
the underlying preference rankings.
32
on deliberative democracy. A constrained minimal revision function satises
universal domain, rational co-domain, consensus preservation and minimal
relevance, while violating independence/systematicity, but does it also sat-
isfy some other desiderata of properly deliberativecommunication?
Obviously, it does not generally satisfy consensus generation, unless the
focusing function always picks out only one admissible output judgment
set for each input prole. What about some other conditions? As already
illustrated, a constrained minimal revision function may satisfy cohesion
generation, where a prole is dened to be cohesive if it generates consis-
tent majority judgments. Cohesion generation is a particularly appealing
condition when the communication process precedes a majority decision.
Another condition is stability under repeated rounds of communication,
the requirement that the transformation function map any output prole
(that is, any prole in the functions range) to itself, or equivalently, that
repeated applications of the function lead to the same output as a single
application.60 A constrained minimal revision function satises this condi-
tion so long as the groups focusing function and the individualsdistance
metrics are su¢ ciently well-behaved.61 Whether stability under repeated
rounds of communication is a plausible requirement depends on how the
judgment transformation function is interpreted. If it is meant to capture
opinion change in a single round of group communication, then there is
60Any transformation function satisfying both consensus preservation and consensus
generation also satises this condition, because its rst application leads to a unanimous
prole and subsequent applications preserve this unanimity. By contrast, suppose the
members of a group sit around a circular table and each individual defers to his or her
neighbour on the right in forming his or her post-communication judgments. This trans-
formation function a special kind of opinion leader function violates the stability con-
dition, as each round of transformation yields a further permutation of the given prole
across individuals.
61The focusing function must have the property that it maps any output prole con-
structed from any set of judgment sets in its range to a new set of judgment sets that still
contains all the judgment sets in the given output prole. The distance metric must have
the standard property that the distance of any judgment set from itself is uniquely zero.
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no reason to expect subsequent rounds of communication to leave opinions
xed. But if it is meant to capture a complete communication process up
to the point of reective equilibrium,62 then the stability condition is very
plausible, arguably more so than consensus generation.
8 Conclusion
I have formalized the problem of judgment transformation and proved a
baseline impossibility result. My approach opens up a new way of analyzing
group communication processes axiomatically, which allows us to determine
which combinations of conditions on such processes are compatible with
e¤ective opinion change and which are not. Among the ve basic condi-
tions introduced, the rst four, I have argued, can be relaxed only in special
cases. The most plausible candidate for relaxation under both normative
and positive interpretations of the model  is the fth condition: indepen-
dence/systematicity.
This observation suggests that e¤ective group communication processes
as envisaged by deliberative democrats must exhibit a certain kind of holism:
The objects of judgment transformation cannot generally be single proposi-
tions in isolation, but must be larger websof interconnected propositions.
As noted, this holistic property of group communication is analogous to
the holistic property of theory testing in science. In empirical science, too,
we cannot generally adjudicate single propositions in isolation, but only in
conjunction with other logically connected propositions.
At one level, this is perhaps an unsurprising result. However, the cost of
this holism in communication, as I have pointed out, is strategic manipula-
bility: Individuals may be able to inuence post-communication judgments
on some propositions in a preferred manner by misrepresenting their pre-
communication judgments on others. The communicative process may also
be open to agenda manipulation. Thus we are faced with a trade-o¤between
62E.g., Rawls (1971).
34
two problematic features of group communication: unchanging mindson
the one hand and strategic manipulability on the other. This trade-o¤,
I think, is quite fundamental: Under a broad range of conditions, group
communication processes either fail to be properly deliberative or violate
strategy-proofness. We cannot generally have both: e¤ective communication
that changes minds and strategy-proofness.
Let me conclude with some remarks about how the present approach
is related to game-theoretic approaches to studying group communication.
While game-theoretic approaches seek to come up with a behavioural the-
ory of group communication, analyzing individuals incentives in commu-
nicative processes and predicting their behaviour on this basis,63 the goal of
the present approach is to map out the logical space of possible functional
relations between pre- and post-communication judgments. The present ap-
proach is thus more akin to social choice theory in the tradition of Arrow
than to game theory, and the relationship between the two approaches is
similar to that between social choice theory and the theory of mechanism
design, which has recently received a lot of attention following the award
of the 2007 Nobel Prizes in Economics.64 The former investigates possi-
ble functional relations between individual inputs and social outputs and
the latter investigates the various mechanisms available (or unavailable) for
implementing these functional relations under certain incentive constraints.
Therefore I see the present approach as complementary to game-theoretic
approaches, not as competitive.
In addition, there are important bridges between the two approaches.
Since the condition of independence can be motivated game-theoretically 
as a requirement for the incentive-compatibility of truthfulness my con-
clusion that realistic group communication processes are likely to violate
it reinforces a central game-theoretic question about group communication:
How can we design communication processes that induce participants to
63See note 3.
64See the survey article by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (2007).
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reveal their judgments truthfully? Broadly, there are at least two ways to
tackle this question. One may either go along the mechanism-design route
and ask what communication processes ensure truthfulness by eliminating
opportunities for benetting from strategic misrepresentation. Or one may
go along a psychological route and ask under what conditions individuals
are truthful even in the presence of strategic opportunities. Which of these
routes or which combination of them is most promising remains a ques-
tion for future research.
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